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Representative/Senator Trump?
Gary Lawson*
The 2016 presidential election sent many people, including
many otherwise seemingly sensible people, completely over the
edge. College and university campuses en masse set up
counseling services for disappointed students, and I suspect that
many faculty and administrators probably “used” those services
at least vicariously. Former friends were ostracized—or, even
worse, “unfriended” on Facebook—for the heinous sin of voting
for Donald Trump. Ordinarily sober scholars describe President
Trump’s election as a symptom of “constitutional rot.”1 At my
own institution, at a post-election panel on which I participated
as the faculty’s token knuckle-dragger, student questions
focused largely on how President Trump could be removed from
office—several months before he actually assumed that office. A
list of anecdotes of this kind could go on for quite a while.
In all fairness to my grieving colleagues and students, I feel
their pain. A lot of us sucked it up, without any school-provided
puppies, for the eight years of the Obama Administration, but it
was a thoroughly miserable time for anyone concerned about
individual freedom. And although I did not vote for George W.
Bush in 2000—I voted for Libertarian Harry Browne—I vividly
remember that, at one brief moment during election night, I
actually felt physically ill when it looked like the execrable Al
Gore might ride his fevered fantasies about feverish planets into
the White House. Presidential elections seem to matter a great
deal to a lot of people.
From a constitutionalist standpoint,2 this is something of a
puzzle. The United States Constitution simply does not appear to
* Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. This article was
prepared for a symposium sponsored by the Chapman Law Review on “Constraining the
Executive,” and I thank the editors for inviting me to participate. I am grateful to R.J.
Pestritto and Joe Postell for helpful suggestions, though they bear no responsibility for
anything that I say here.
1 Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot and Constitutional Crisis, 77 MARYLAND L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018).
2 By “constitutionalist” I mean nothing more linguistically complex than “by
reference to and in accordance with the meaning of the United States Constitution.” That
meaning was fixed—at least for the original Constitution and quite possibly for
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make the president all that important of a figure. To be sure, in
times of war, the president is commander-in-chief of the armed
forces,3 but the Constitution gives Congress the powers to
“declare War,” to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” to
“make Rules regarding Captures,” to “raise and support Armies,”
to “provide and maintain a Navy,” to “make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces,” and
to provide for “calling forth” and “organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia.”4 Congress actually has most of the
constitutional war powers–so much so that the Commander-inChief Clause was necessary to foreclose an inference that
Congress also has the un-enumerated, but implied, power to
control troop movements.5 Furthermore, while the president’s
“executive Power”6 gives him7 control over the law enforcement
machinery, that power is subject to duties to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed”8 and to carry out executive
responsibilities in accordance with fiduciary principles.9 More
fundamentally, executive power is, in all but a very small set of
contexts, a purely implementational power that comes into play
only to execute law that is provided from sources external to the
executive.10 The president can also grant pardons,11 convene and
adjourn Congress,12 and, with the advice and consent of the

amendments as well—in 1788, in the sense that the criteria for determining the referents
of the concepts in the Constitution are determined by the cognitive framework of a
reasonable reader in 1788. See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or:
Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1460–67 (2016); Gary Lawson
& Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006).
3 I believe that this authority comes from the Vesting Clause of Article I rather than
from the more specific Commander-in-Chief Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, which
states that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States.” This simply confirms the president’s “executive Power” to command the
military, but that point is incidental to the present argument.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16.
5 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 29–30 (2006).
6 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
7 The Constitution consistently refers to the president by a generic male pronoun. I
therefore follow that practice, without endorsing it.
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
9 For a book-length defense of the proposition that all constitutional powers,
including the executive power, are fiduciary powers, see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN,
“A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017).
For an article-length defense of a duty of care on the part of federal officials, and therefore
of a presidential duty of care in the execution of the laws, see Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and the Federal Government’s
Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
10 See Gary Lawson, Take the Fifth . . . Please! The Original Insignificance of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, 2017 BYU L. REV. 611, 631 (2018).
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
12 Id. § 3.
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Senate, make appointments and treaties,13 but it is hard to see
how powers of this kind could generate Caesarian nightmares.
The sum total of constitutional presidential powers is far
from trivial; the American president is—and always was—a
formidable constitutional figure.14 But it is not necessarily a lifealtering huge sum either. Even if one believes, as I emphatically
do, that the Article II Vesting Clause grants the president all
power that falls within the conceptual category of “executive
Power,”15 the conceptual lines of the power limit its scope.
Possessing the “executive Power” does not allow the president to
take over steel mills unilaterally in order to help a war effort,16
and it does not allow the president to order federal courts to
dismiss pending cases in order to promote foreign policy goals.17
If one looks at the presidency through a constitutional lens, it is
hard to see why people would get as emotionally charged as they
do about who occupies that office. As a matter of original
meaning, it just would not make that much of a difference in
most people’s lives. It probably matters more who is mayor of
one’s city—and perhaps even who is on the local zoning board.
As a matter of political and social reality rather than original
meaning, of course, strong reactions to presidential elections are
more understandable. The modern presidency bears little
relationship to the office created by the Constitution of 1788.18
Presidents today matter far more than they should if one’s
touchstone is the Constitution. For one thing, presidents have,
with the blessing of Congress, assumed powers of at best dubious
constitutional lineage on everything from uses of military force19
Id. § 2, cl. 2.
See generally SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING:
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015).
15 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 5, at 22–43. For the most powerful rebuttal to
that position, see Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s
“Executive Vesting Clause”—Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31
WHITTIER L. REV. 1 (2009).
16 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (correctly
so holding).
17 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675–76 (1981) (not doing quite as well
as Youngstown, and indeed pretty much making a botch of everything).
18 It is conventional to use 1789 as the starting date for the United States
Constitution. That is the correct date for when a fully functioning government under the
Constitution, including a sworn-in Congress and president, first appeared. The
Constitution, however, became law for the ratifying states on June 21, 1788 (or at most
shortly thereafter), and at least some important portions of the Constitution were
effective as of the summer of 1788. See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did
the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2001).
19 See Gary Lawson, Inigo Montoya Goes to War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1355, 1364–67
(2015) (describing constitutional controversies over the scope of presidential power to
initiate hostilities).
13
14
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to the unilateral establishment of military governments in
peacetime within the United States.20 For another thing, federal
courts have routinely assumed powers far beyond those
plausibly attributable to the “judicial Power”21 conferred by the
Constitution. Consequently, the power to appoint federal judges
has acquired significance beyond anything contemplated in the
eighteenth century. But most importantly, in modern times, the
election of the American president effectively elects the federal
legislature as well. That is because the executive has become, for
all practical purposes, the legislative department (at least when
the judicial department chooses not to assume that authority).
Modern executive action, through regulations, adjudications, and
enforcement decisions, creates law that often has far more effect
on people’s lives than the entire mass of congressional legislation
does. Congress has fostered that development by delegating—or,
more precisely, subdelegating22—much of its legislative authority
to the executive department via open-ended statutes that
essentially instruct executive actors to go forth and do good. A
great many federal statutes make lawmakers, not laws. As a
consequence, presidential elections determine far more than the
Constitution of 1788 ever had in mind. It is no wonder that
people get so invested in them.
That level of investment is potentially a bad thing in several
respects. It is constitutionally bad because it reflects a perversion
of the constitutional design. It is socially bad if one believes that
politics should not matter so much that people turn on each other
for supporting different candidates and policies. And it might be
intellectually bad because people who care too much about
something do not always think clearly and logically about it.
Part One of this essay very briefly catalogues the extent to
which the American presidency has effectively become the
American Congress through subdelegation of legislative
authority. Part Two just as briefly explains why that is a
constitutional perversion. Part Three suggests, contrary to the
fears of many who are in the throes of Trump Derangement
Syndrome, how the Trump presidency may present the best
opportunity in generations to reverse the trend of subdelegation
and begin the long process of reining in executive power.
20 That happened? Yep, that happened. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The
Hobbesian Constitution: Governing without Authority, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 581, 617–24 (2001).
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
22 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 377 (2014)
(explaining that the constitutional “delegation” problem is really a subdelegation problem
because Congress was delegated the legislative power in the first instance).
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Ironically, the change agent, if any change actually happens, is
likely to be President Trump.
In no event do I expect the presidency of 2020 to look
anything like the presidency of 1788. But for the first time
in a long time, there is a chance that one might see some
movement on that front toward, rather than away from, the
United States Constitution.
I. “MEET THE NEW BOSS”
The American presidency has grown in power since 1788 for
many reasons, and it would require someone better versed than I
in both history and political science to describe and analyze them
all.23 But one of those reasons obviously dwarfs in magnitude all
of the others: Congress has essentially designated the president
as its substitute legislature. The expansion of presidential power
through subdelegation of legislative authority is so enormous
that any attempt to restrain executive power that does not
address the subdelegation problem head-on is like putting bandaids on Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid after their final
encounter with the Bolivian police. The federal executive now
functions as the federal legislature for many, and perhaps even
most, practical purposes. Federal law, in the modern world, is
largely an executive construct. The observation is common
enough to be almost mundane. As Professor Mila Sohoni aptly
summarized the conventional wisdom:
Due to gridlock and partisanship, Congress is less able to act as an
effective lawmaker and hence as an institution that actually authorizes
and controls agency action. With respect to some statutes . . . ,
Congress has conferred primary custodianship over the shape and
structure of regulatory schemes on agencies by giving agencies the
power to waive and alter key statutory requirements. In other
areas . . . , the accretion of complex statutory schemes and the opacity
of legislative intent have together produced a system of “de
facto delegation” that effectively transfers lawmaking power to the
executive branch.24

23 For an outstanding effort at such an account by someone better versed than I in
both history and political science, see generally JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN
AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
(2017). Professor Postell’s book is an indispensable supplement and, in some cases,
antidote to Professor Jerry Mashaw’s seminal book on early administrative law. See
generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).
24 Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights,
66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1701 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
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Professor Adrian Vermeule put it even more succinctly: “[T]he
executive and administrative sector of the state . . . often
overshadows the classical institutions of the Constitution of
1789 altogether.” 25
There is no uniquely correct way to measure the relative
influence of legislative and executive—and, for that matter,
judicial—action in the creation of federal law. But even crude
metrics tell an important story. At the end of 2012, the number of
pages in the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) exceeded the
number of pages in the United States Code by a factor of nearly
four.26 Notwithstanding the numerous problems, vectoring in
somewhat different directions, with this comparison—the
Statutes at Large rather than the United States Code is the
better measure of congressional lawmaking; many regulations
simply parrot statutory language and thus add nothing to the
legal baseline;27 gross volume numbers do not convey information
about relative importance; and an enormous amount of federal
law is made through executive adjudication rather than
executive rulemaking, and thus does not show up in measures of
the CFR—there is something striking about the raw figures
comparing statutes and regulations. At the very least, it
constitutes a piece of concrete evidence, if any is actually needed,
that executive lawmaking is central to modern governance.
Casual anecdotalism28 sheds further light on the relative
importance of executive and legislative action in the creation of
federal law. Two of the most important statutes enacted during
the Obama Administration—The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act29 and the Dodd-Frank Act30—consume
thousands of pages of text between them, but they are both
toothless in important respects until implemented through
significant regulatory action. As with most modern regulatory

25 ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 3 (2016).
26 See Tom Cummins, Code Words, 5 J. LEGAL METRICS 89, 98 (2015).
27 Such “parroting” regulations could add to the legal baseline if they were given
deference by courts. But regulations that simply repeat what is said in statutes do not
receive deference. See Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257–58 (2006). To be sure,
regulations do not seem to need to differ much from statutory language in order to avoid
the “anti-parroting” rule of Gonzalez. See Plateau Mining Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety &
Health Review Comm’n, 519 F.3d 1176, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2008).
28 Yes, it is a word. I looked it up.
29 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
30 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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statutes, they frequently authorize executive agencies to make
law rather than prescribe rules of conduct for executive agencies
to implement.
Consider, as just one example, some interlocking provisions
from the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).31 One of the central
concepts underlying the ACA is the “qualified health plan,” which
is the only kind of plan that can be sold on the ACA exchanges. It
is therefore vital under the statute to know what makes a health
care plan “qualified.” The basic statutory definition of a “qualified
health plan” is one that “has in effect a certification . . . that such
plan meets the criteria for certification described in section
18031(c) of this title.”32 The criteria for certification prescribed
by section 18031(c) are: “The Secretary [of Health and Human
Services] shall, by regulation, establish criteria for the
certification of health plans as qualified health plans.”33 In other
words, the statute does not establish the criteria but instructs an
executive official to provide them. To be sure, the statute then
sets out nine considerations that must be part of that executive
prescription, but those considerations are basically drivel,34 much
as were the statutory “constraints” in the National Industrial
Recovery Act35 or the directions to the United States Sentencing
Commission in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.36 The ACA
also makes clear that a qualified health plan must “provide[] the
essential health benefits package described in section 18022(a).”37
It is anticlimactic to point out that section 18022(a) reads in
relevant part: “[T]he term ‘essential health benefits package’
means, with respect to any health plan, coverage that . . . provides
for the essential health benefits defined by the Secretary [of
Health and Human Services] under subsection (b).”38
These provisions are noteworthy in modern times for being
more specific than one has come to expect from major
31 For an interesting discussion of subdelegation of legislative authority under the
Dodd-Frank Act and other securities laws, see Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and
Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L. J. 435, 437 (2017). See also Tom Campbell,
Executive Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 566 (2017) (noting that the DoddFrank Act contains “398 specific calls in the statute for regulatory agencies, including the
newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to issue rules, interpreting
vague concepts such as ‘unfairness’ by financial institutions, and ‘systemic risk’”)
(footnote omitted).
32 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(A) (2012).
33 Id. § 18031(c)(1).
34 See id. § 18031(c)(1)(A)–(I).
35 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 534–35 (1935).
36 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374–77 (1989).
37 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B). The plan must also be provided by a properly licensed
insurer. See id. § 18021(a)(1)(C).
38 Id. § 18022(a)(1).
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congressional legislation. The Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008,39 one of the most famous (or infamous) legislative
legacies to emerge from the second Bush Administration, handed
the Secretary of the Treasury three quarters of a trillion dollars
with which to “purchase . . . troubled assets from any financial
institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by
the Secretary.”40 “Troubled assets,” in case anyone wonders, are
mortgages and “any other financial instrument that the
Secretary . . . determines the purchase of which is necessary to
promote financial market stability . . . .”41 Throw on such old
standards that populate the United States Code as the
Communications Act of 193442 and the Clean Air Act,43 and one
can see that much modern legislation does not make law, but
instead merely designates executive agents as lawmakers.44 The
president, as the ultimate repository of all executive power,
thereby becomes the de facto Congress. The president and other
executive agents make the law. President Trump is thus also,
over a staggeringly large range of cases, Representative Trump
and Senator Trump to boot—with no requirements of quorums,
cloture, or majority votes to stand in the way of his lawmaking.
To be sure, in the real world it is “other executive agents” far
more than it is the president who makes the law. The federal
executive apparatus is so enormous that even the most

39 Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 12 &
26 U.S.C.).
40 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (2012).
41 Id. § 5202 (2012). The subdelegation problem was just one of many constitutional
infirmities with the Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”). See Gary Lawson, Burying
the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 57–58 (2010).
42 47 U.S.C. § 307 (2012) (providing that the Federal Communications Commission
shall grant broadcast licenses to applicants “if public convenience, interest, or necessity
will be served thereby”).
43 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012) (providing that the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency shall set primary air quality standards, “the attainment and
maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and
allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health”).
44 For a less consequential, but no less legally significant, example, consider the law
underlying the events in Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). Captain Yates
threw overboard some undersized grouper that he had caught in the Gulf of Mexico, and
he was prosecuted for concealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or
influence” a federal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). The Yates Supreme Court
decision focused on whether fish were “tangible object[s]” within the meaning of this
statute, Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1077, but consider for a moment why Captain Yates felt the
need to throw his fish overboard. What federal statute prescribed the maximum length of
red grouper for American fishing vessels? There was no such statute; the only relevant
statute made it illegal “to violate . . . any regulation or permit” issued by the National
Marine Fisheries Services. 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(A) (2012). For a more detailed account of
the federal “law”—all stemming from executive regulations—regarding the permissible
size of Gulf of Mexico red grouper, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 108–09.
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committed president can control only a tiny fraction of what
actually goes on within it. Congressional subdelegation thus
creates an alternative multi-member Congress within the
executive whose institutional functioning is too complex to be
captured by any simple analogy. Nonetheless, as a formal matter,
all executive power is lodged in the president, even if he cannot
always effectively exercise it in the face of a “deep state” that has
its own agenda(s).
Of course, there are serious limits even to this expanded
executive power, as recent (as of July 2017) events concerning
efforts to repeal or amend the ACA demonstrate. The president
cannot simply wave a law into or out of existence. The legislature
is not irrelevant. But the constitutional role of the legislature is
not to be “not irrelevant.” It is to make the law, which is then
executed by the president and other executive agents. Much of
the time, that is simply not how it works.
II. “WHY SHOULD I CARE, WHY SHOULD I CARE?”
Is it really a constitutional problem if the president makes
the law? To ask the question is to answer it, at least as a matter
of original meaning. Indeed, there are few propositions of
constitutional meaning as thoroughly overdetermined as the
unconstitutionality of subdelegations of legislative authority. I
have spent much of the past quarter century defending that
claim, and I will not repeat those extensive arguments here
beyond the brief references in this section.
One can discern a constitutional principle against
subdelegation of legislative authority through any number of
convergent lines of reasoning. The basic principle of enumerated
powers reserves all “legislative powers herein granted” to
Congress and thus denies them to executive (or judicial) agents,45
whose enumerated powers do not include the power to legislate.
A law subdelegating legislative power to the president or an
executive official would not be “necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution” federal powers.46 To let the president make,
rather than execute, law would violate the principle of legality
that has been part of the Anglo-American legal tradition since
the Magna Carta and that underlies the constitutional idea of
due process of law.47 And, most powerfully and fundamentally,
See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 180–81 (7th ed. 2016).
See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 242–67 (2005); Gary Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 345–52 (2002).
47 See Lawson, supra note 10, at 618–26.
45
46
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subdelegation violates the fiduciary principles that underlie the
Constitution. The United States Constitution is most aptly
characterized as a kind of fiduciary instrument,48 and the
background principles of interpretation for the document are
therefore at least partially defined by the background rules for
interpretation of eighteenth-century fiduciary instruments.49 One
of the best-established eighteenth-century fiduciary duties is the
requirement that agents exercising delegated discretionary
authority personally exercise rather than subdelegate that
authority.50 Accordingly, if a fiduciary instrument is to allow the
agent to subdelegate discretionary authority,51 the instrument
needs specifically to provide for such authority, at least where
authority to subdelegate is not incidental to the granted power.
The United States Constitution contains no specific authorization
for the subdelegation of legislative—or, for that matter, of
executive or judicial—power. As Guy Seidman and I have said:
There is no affirmative grant of power in the Constitution to
subdelegate legislative authority. The necessary and proper clause,
the only plausible source of such authority, only authorizes incidental
powers, and the power to sub-delegate can be incidental only with
respect to ministerial tasks, or where delegation is necessary in a
strict sense, or where there was in the eighteenth century an
established custom or usage of subdelegation. In other words,
understanding the agency-law foundations of the Constitution
confirms what textual, intratextual, and structural analysis all reveal:
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to other actors, be
they executive agents, judicial agents, state governments, foreign
sovereigns, or private parties. The rule against subdelegation of
legislative authority is among the clearest constitutional rules one
can imagine.52

Outside of governance of occupied territory during wartime53 and
the constitutionally specified power to make treaties,54 the
president is not supposed to make laws. That is the job of the
constitutionally vested legislative authority. The president is
supposed to execute (and faithfully execute) the laws provided
by others.

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 49–75.
See id. at 8–11, 76–78.
50 See id. at 113–17.
51 Agents are generally free, absent specification in the governing instrument, to
subdelegate the performance of ministerial tasks.
52 LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 117.
53 See GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 47–51 (2004).
54 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
48
49
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The real question is not whether Congress can subdelegate
discretionary authority—the short answer is “no.” The real
question is what constitutes an act of subdelegation. Surely
Congress cannot subdelegate its formal Article I, Section 7 power
to vote on bills, but suppose Congress exercises that formal
power by enacting Article I, Section 7 laws that tell executive
agents to go find problems and then fix them. Does the
constitutional anti-subdelegation principle control the content of
the laws that Congress can enact? Does it forbid granting
executive (and judicial) agents a certain kind, quantity, and
quality of discretion, even if those grants fulfill the formal
procedural requirements for constitutional lawmaking?
Some say no. For example, in the early 2000s, Eric Posner
and Adrian Vermeuele argued that Congress can only be said to
subdelegate its power when it transfers its formal authority
under Article I, Section 7; it can never be said to subdelegate
when it vests substantive authority in executive agents, no
matter how open-ended the grant of authority may be.55 I have
an article-length response to that argument elsewhere,56 and that
response is both supported and supplanted by subsequent work
on the fiduciary underpinnings of the Constitution.57 Congress is
not granted a general legislative power. It is charged with
specific tasks and given tools with which to perform those tasks.
Those charges call for the exercise of discretionary authority, and
in the absence of specific authorization to subdelegate those
authorities, Congress must exercise those powers itself. Under
basic fiduciary principles, Congress cannot pass off the exercise
of those discretionary acts to others, even by enactments that
follow the form of Article I, Section 7:
Consider just the structure of Article I, Section 8. Its first seventeen
clauses contain provisions that give Congress power to perform such
actions as to “lay and collect,” “borrow,” “regulate,” “establish,”
“coin . . . , regulate . . . , and fix,” “provide,” “establish,” “promote . . . by
securing,” “constitute,” “define and punish,” “declare . . . , grant . . . ,
and make Rules concerning,” “raise and support,” “provide and
maintain,” “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of,”
55 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003).
56 See Lawson, Discretion as Delegation, supra note 46.
57 See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 107–26. I would be remiss if I did not
thank Robert Natelson for making me aware of the importance of understanding the
fiduciary character of the Constitution. My long-time collaborator Guy Seidman saw that
point before I did, and he pushed me a bit in that direction, but Mr. Natelson’s work is
what really brought home to both me and Professor Seidman the need to bring fiduciary
concepts to bear on constitutional interpretation across the board.
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“provide for calling forth,” “provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining,” and “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over” . . . . Exactly who, in this governmental scheme, is
supposed to be doing the lion’s share of the laying and collecting,
borrowing, regulating, establishing, coining, regulating, fixing,
providing, establishing, promoting by securing, constituting, defining
and punishing, declaring, granting, making Rules concerning, raising
and supporting, providing and maintaining, making Rules for the
Government and Regulation of, providing for calling forth, providing
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, and exercising exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over?58

Just as not everything done by presidents through procedurally
proper means is necessarily a constitutionally valid exercise of
“executive Power,” and not everything done by courts through
procedurally proper means is necessarily a constitutionally valid
exercise of “judicial Power,” not everything done by Congress
through procedurally proper means is necessarily a
constitutionally valid exercise of the various “legislative Powers
herein granted” with which Congress is vested. The principle
against subdelegation is substantive, not formal.
To be sure, the conceptual lines between the constitutionally
vested legislative and executive powers are not always crisp. It
does not necessarily violate the Constitution for Congress to pass
a law that requires some measure of interpretation. Figuring out
where the executive power ends and the legislative power begins
“is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry,”59 and James Madison
drily observed that “[q]uestions daily occur in the course of
practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects,
and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.”60
That adept-puzzling obscurity, however, did not stop Madison from
categorically declaring that various powers of government are “in
their nature . . . legislative, executive, or judiciary.” Nor did it stop
John Adams from stating that the “three branches of power have an
unalterable foundation in nature; that they exist in every
society natural and artificial . . . ; that the legislative and executive
authorities are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws
depend entirely on a separation of them in the frame of
government . . . .” Nor did it prevent many state constitutions of the
founding era from including separation-of-powers clauses that
expressly distinguished, again without express definitions, the
legislative from the executive from the judicial powers. Nor did it
prevent the United States Constitution from basing its entire scheme

58
59
60

Lawson, Discretion as Delegation, supra note 46, at 263.
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
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of governance on the distinctions among those powers. However
difficult it may be at the margins to distinguish those categories of
power from each other, the founding generation assumed that there
was a fact of the matter about those distinctions and that one could
discern that fact in at least a large range of cases. The communicative
meaning of the Constitution of 1788 cannot be ascertained without
reference to some such distinction, even if legal scholars or political
scientists (adept or otherwise) find the distinction unhelpful
or confusing.61

As Chief Justice John Marshall memorably put it:
The line has not been exactly drawn which separate those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,
from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made,
and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions
to fill up the details.62

But wherever and however that line is properly drawn, huge
swaths of modern law go beyond any plausible boundaries. Going
forth and doing good pursuant to a statute that instructs the
executive to go forth and do good is not an exercise of “executive
Power” under any sensible eighteenth-century understanding of
that concept, and that simple observation is enough to sweep in
many of the statutes at the core of modern law. Nor is enactment
of such a law a valid exercise of legislative power. Congress,
under the Constitution, must enact laws, not empty collections
of words.
This is as good a place as any to respond to a recent critique
of this argument from Adrian Vermeule. Professor Vermeule
maintains that “the institutional innovations that appall Lawson
[such as subdelegation of legislative authority] were themselves
generated by the very system of lawmaking-by-separation-of-powers
that he wants to defend. Lawson never comes to grip with the
problem of abnegation, the brute fact that everything Lawson
deems inconsistent with the Constitution of 1789 emerged
through and by means of the operation of that very Constitution,
not despite it.”63 More broadly:
We have an administrative state that has been created and limited by
the sustained and bipartisan action of Congress and the President
over time; that is supervised and checked by the President as it
operates; and that has been blessed by an enduring bipartisan
consensus on the Supreme Court. The classical Constitution of
separated powers, cooperating in joint lawmaking across all three

61
62
63

Lawson, supra note 10, at 623–34(footnotes omitted).
Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43.
VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 42.
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branches, itself gave rise to the administrative state. When critics of
the administrative state call for a return to the classical Constitution,
they do not seem to realize they are asking for the butterfly to return
to its own chrysalis. If political legitimacy is not to be found in this
long-sustained and judicially-approved joint action of Congress and
the President, the premier democratically elected and democratically
legitimate bodies in our constitutional system . . . and the real complaint
of the critics is not that the administrative state is illegitimate, but that
our whole constitutional order is intrinsically misguided.64

This argument rests on a distressingly common error: it conflates
arguments about textual meaning with arguments about political
and moral legitimacy. I have in the past made, and am here
making, no claims whatsoever about the political legitimacy vel
non of the administrative state, the Constitution in general, or
any form of governmental organization. As I have said elsewhere:
I have nothing interesting to say about such matters, and so I choose
to say nothing about them. Legitimacy is a political and moral
concept, and I am not a political or moral theorist . . . . To be sure,
political legitimacy is an important thing about which to think. It just
is not the province of legal theory, and I would prefer not to venture
outside that relatively narrow zone of comfort in professional
academic work.65

My only claim, here and elsewhere, is that subdelegation of
legislative authority is contrary to the meaning of the
Constitution. I declare nothing about what any real-world person
ought to do with that information or how any past, present, or
future political actors should respond to it.66 And I emphatically
make no claim that constitutional infidelity is a distinctively
modern phenomenon. The very first statute enacted by the
very first Congress was wildly, flagrantly, and knowingly
unconstitutional.67 So are a great many statutes that have been
enacted by past and present congresses, signed and enforced by
past and present presidents, and upheld and applied by past and
present judges. That is not “hubris.”68 That is empirical fact, as
all claims of constitutional meaning are claims of empirical fact.
It may or may not be an intellectually interesting empirical fact,
depending upon one’s intellectual interests, but it is an empirical
fact. In other words, in my professional guise, I do not see myself
Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism
and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1567 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
66 For more on the oft-elided distinction between claims of constitutional meaning
and claims of political obligation, see Gary Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, 93
B.U. L. REV. 1309 (2013).
67 See Gary Lawson, The Constitution’s Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 399, 403–06 (2009).
68 VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 45.
64
65
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as a “critic[] of the administrative state.”69 I see myself as a
disinterested expositor of the Constitution.70 As a straightforward
interpretative matter, the Constitution forbids the subdelegation
of legislative authority, no matter how socially inevitable,
normatively desirable, or politically legitimate it may be. One can
certainly elect to choose social inevitability, normative desirability,
or political legitimacy over the Constitution, but that has no
bearing on what the Constitution actually says.
III. “YOU NEED A NEW SONG”
Assuming that one regards unconstitutional subdelegation
as a problem,71 it is beyond pointless to look to Congress for
solutions to that problem. Congress created the problem by
giving away its authority in the first place. Psychologists,
historians, and political scientists are better situated than I to
say why this has happened, but some fairly obvious considerations
come to mind. “By delegating the ultimate decision to an agency,
Congress can take credit for doing something while dodging the
blame from disappointed constituents.”72 Realistically, though, can
this kind of transparent ploy actually work to improve legislators’
electoral prospects? Evidently so: “[P]olitical scientists have
documented the value of ‘credit-claiming’ and ‘position-taking’ in
legislators’ efforts to maximize the probability of re-election.”73
Moreover, subdelegation has efficiency benefits for legislators:
“Legislators delegate authority in order to reduce various costs of
legislating, which allows them to legislate more private goods.
Stated differently, delegation reduces the legislator’s marginal
cost of private-goods production[.]”74 It also offers efficiency of
access for interest groups: By “unbundling” specific items (such
as energy regulation) from everything else on the legislative

Id. at 23.
Of course, anyone who knows me knows that, in my personal rather than
professional guise, I am emphatically a critic of the administrative state. They also know,
however, that in that guise I am emphatically a critic of non-administrative states as well.
I dispute the moral legitimacy of all governments—big, small, state, federal,
administrative, non-administrative, constitutional, and non-constitutional. That personal
position has, I believe, no bearing whatsoever on my empirical scholarly claims regarding
constitutional meaning, which stand or fall on the quality of the observations and
arguments offered for them.
71 Because I do not maintain that anyone must so assume, everything beyond this
point is in the form of a hypothetical imperative.
72 Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 369–70 (2010).
73 David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 135 (2000).
74 Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56 (1982).
69
70
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agenda (such as monetary policy, drug policy, and foreign trade)
it allows parties with concentrated interests to focus their
attention on institutions (agencies) wholly dedicated to their
precise area of concern. It is not surprising that Congress and
those who seek to influence Congress would find subdelegation
very attractive.75
To be sure, there are occasional token thrusts in Congress to
gain some measure of legislative control over executive
lawmaking. The Congressional Review Act, which is part of the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,76
provides a mechanism for fast-track legislative cancellation of
major agency rules,77 and the statute has been employed more
than a dozen times in 2017 after being used only once in its first
two decades.78 A version of the so-called REINS (“Regulations
from the Executive [I]n Need of Scrutiny”) Act, which would
require Congress legislatively to approve major rules before they
take effect, has made it farther through Congress in 2017 than it
has ever gone before,79 though its prospects for ultimate passage
are dubious. Through all of this, however, the simple expedient of
passing real statutes instead of vague mush and/or amending the
old enactments that are really subdelegations masquerading as
statutes is nowhere on the congressional agenda. Hence the first
sentence of this section.80
Nor can one plausibly rely on the courts to police legislative
subdelegations. The Supreme Court’s complete retreat from the
field of subdelegation is too well known to require elaborate
summary.81 Liberal and conservative jurisprudes disagree on
75 For more background on the positive political science literature regarding
rationales for congressional delegation, see Rodrigues, supra note 31, at 447–49.
76 Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat.
857–74 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5 and 15 of the United States Code).
77 For a brief description of the statute, see LAWSON, supra note 45, at 173–74.
78 See Stephen Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional
Review Act, WASH.TIMES (July 22, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/
15/gop-rolled-back-14-of-15-obama-rules-using-congress/ [http://perma.cc/Z8G4-HX5A].
79 See Eric Boehm, Rand Paul’s REINS Act Finally Makes It to Senate Floor,
REASON.COM (July 17, 2017, 5:32 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/05/17/rand-paulsreins-act-finally-makes-it-to [http://perma.cc/BK83-85E8].
80 Cf. VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 9 (“Congress episodically rouses itself to enact
framework statutes intended to constrain executive power in a global way . . . . But these
statutes are mostly dead letters, for the spasm of congressional resolve that leads to their
enactment is not sustained over time.”).
81 See Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, supra note 46, at 328–29 (“After
1935, the Court has steadfastly maintained that Congress need only provide an
‘intelligible principle’ to guide decisionmaking [sic], and it has steadfastly found
intelligible principles where less discerning readers find gibberish.”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (“[T]he conventional
[delegation] doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”). To be
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many things, but they have found common cause—or, more
precisely, an overlapping consensus—in capitulation to
congressional desire to subdelegate its authority. Some Justices
fly the flag of surrender because, on policy grounds, they want to
grease the wheels of the administrative state. As a nearunanimous Supreme Court said with admirable candor (if
perhaps less admirable lack of regard for law): “[I]n our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job[?!]
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.”82 Others flee the battlefield because of an extraconstitutional concern about judicial discretion: “[W]hile the
doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a
fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an
element readily enforceable by the courts.”83 Although Justice
Thomas has expressed some interest in enforcing a constitutional
ban on subdelegations,84 and Justice Gorsuch may be more
receptive to such arguments than was Justice Scalia,85 no one
seriously expects the federal courts to rise up and smite major
portions of the administrative state in the name of the
Constitution of 1788.
That leaves, as the last line of constitutional defense, the
president.86 There is any number of tools available to presidents
sure, Professor Sunstein and I may both be overstating our cases. It is surely a mistake to
gauge the effectiveness of a principle against subdelegation by how many laws get
overturned by courts rather than by how closely legislatures hew to that principle without
need for judicial invalidation. See Joseph Postell & Paul D. Moreno, Not Dead Yet – or
Never Born? The Reality of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 3 CONST. STUDIES (forthcoming
2017). And while the subdelegation doctrine has been dead in the Supreme Court for a
long time, it has occasional sparks of life in the lower courts (and, quite possibly, has a
new ally on the Supreme Court). See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
82 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). And what, precisely, is
Congress’s constitutional “job”? To regulate in a way and to a degree that is pleasing to
the political sensibilities of a majority of the Supreme Court? One might think, looking at
the Constitution, that Congress’s job is to legislate in accordance with the substantive and
procedural norms prescribed by the Constitution. But, then again, one might think,
looking at the Constitution, many things which are at odds with statements in Supreme
Court opinions. The explanation, of course, is that statements in Supreme Court opinions
almost never try to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution, so it is not at all surprising
that they almost uniformly fail to do so.
83 Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an explanation of why this concern about
judicial discretion is extra-constitutional, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (2014).
84 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–52 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
85 See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153–54.
86 Technically, the last line of constitutional defense is an armed citizenry, but
it would surely take more than some unconstitutional subdelegations to warrant
outright revolution.
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to resist unconstitutional subdelegations if they are inclined to
use those tools. Most obviously, presidents can veto proposed
legislation that fails to make law. Congress can override those
vetoes with a two-thirds majority in each House, but a
presidential veto can be a serious roadblock to subdelegation.
Moreover, the president could issue a veto message
communicating the constitutional grounds for the action and
thereby raise public awareness of Congress’s constitutional failure.
The president could also recommend legislation amending or
repealing past laws that unconstitutionally subdelegate authority.
Appointing judges who take the Constitution seriously could also
indirectly help in this regard. Finally, and most dramatically
(and therefore least plausibly), the president could refuse to
enforce laws that unconstitutionally subdelegate legislative
power. Presidents have a power and duty of executive review
that is equal to, and derives from the same source as, the
collateral power of judicial review.87 If courts are allowed, and
indeed required, to refuse to give legal effect to unconstitutional
laws, the same is true of presidents (and everyone else in the
constitutional order). At this point, however, the shade of Andrew
Johnson will surely begin whispering about the possible
consequences of presidential nonenforcement of statutes on
constitutional grounds. A genuine constitutionalist will respond
that the president nonetheless has an unconditional obligation to
the Constitution, consequences be damned.88 Even if one does not
take this extreme tack, however, there is no obvious reason why
presidents cannot, and constitutionally should not, make use of
the other tools at their disposal to resist subdelegation. All that
is needed is the will to use those tools.
At first glance, it may seem even more absurd to rely on the
president to police subdelegations of legislative authority than to
rely on Congress or the courts. Don’t such subdelegations by
definition increase the power of the executive, both absolutely
and relative to its chief institutional competitors? If Congress is
willing to cede some, or even most, of its authority to the
president, who would expect the president to decline the offer?

87 For a lengthy explication of this position, see generally Gary Lawson &
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 1267 (1996).
88 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (prescribing the presidential oath of office as: “I
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the
United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States”).
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As with the Spanish Inquisition, no one expects it. But, as
with the Spanish Inquisition, it just might appear anyway. To be
sure, history is on the side of the skeptics. The Reagan
Administration made a great fuss over constitutional fidelity,
especially in the realm of separation of powers. In the 1980s,
Attorney General Edwin Meese III gave voice to some
monumental, and monumentally important, constitutional
principles dealing with the separation of powers, such as
departmentalism and the unitary executive.89 The Justice
Department was filled with constitutional originalists who
understood quite well that the Constitution does not authorize
subdelegation of legislative authority. With all of that
intellectual and political firepower assembled, what was the
number of bills vetoed by President Reagan on the ground that
they unconstitutionally subdelegated legislative power to the
president? That would be zero. The number of bills introduced or
supported by the Reagan Administration to repeal or replace old
statutes that unconstitutionally subdelegate legislative power to
the president? That would also be zero. The number of such bills
vetoed or championed, respectively, by either of the Bush
Administrations? Yep, zero again. (I assume that no one finds it
necessary for me to repeat these numbers for modern Democrat
administrations.) All conventional grounds for judgment suggest
that the executive department is a central part of the problem of
subdelegation of legislative authority and likely the last place
that one should look for a solution.
Enter Donald Trump. Exit conventional grounds for
judgment. Whatever one thinks of Donald Trump (and I confess
that I have a higher regard for him than do most of the people
with whom I usually associate), one must acknowledge that the
usual rules of politics do not apply to him. Indeed, his election
was, at least for many who voted for him, precisely a pair of
double-barreled middle fingers thrust into the face of political
convention (with a loud razzberry added for good measure). The
fact that invoking a constitutional principle against
subdelegation of legislative authority would elicit shrieks of
horror from the political and cultural establishment would not
necessarily deter President Trump from doing it. Indeed, it just
might be an added incentive.
The question is whether there is anything substantive that
would or could motivate President Trump to take a stand against
89 See Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 701 (2005).
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legislative subdelegation, perhaps by vetoing proposed legislation
on constitutional subdelegation grounds and issuing a stinging
veto message. Several considerations suggest—and I emphasize
that I deliberately use the word “suggest” in its literal and
modest sense—that there might be.
First, President Trump’s key appointments to legal offices
speak to a commitment to constitutional first principles that
exceeds that of any president in my lifetime. His first
appointment to the Supreme Court was Neil Gorsuch, who, as a
court of appeals judge, specifically raised the idea of reviving the
subdelegation doctrine.90 President Trump’s nominations to the
lower federal courts thus far also have originalists cheering and
maybe even salivating. And both of his appointees to top
executive department legal positions—Attorney General Jeff
Sessions and White House Counsel Don McGahn—are long-time
advocates (if not necessarily consistent practitioners) of
originalism. The pairing is significant. My recollection from
three-plus decades ago is that the Reagan Justice Department
was more than occasionally at odds with the White House
Counsel’s Office, which had considerably less enthusiasm than
did Attorney General Meese and his staff for picking fights about
broad structural principles. That kind of internal conflict reduces
the likelihood of bold action. If the Department of Justice and
White House Counsel’s Office are both strongly committed to
originalism, they can speak with a united front on subdelegation.
No originalist can defend, with a straight face, the gross
subdelegations of legislative power that pervade modern
government as consistent with the Constitution.91
Second, all of the foregoing considerations suggest that
President Trump is inclined to defer, on legal and constitutional
matters, to those who he regards as reliable experts on those
subjects. No one seriously believes that Donald Trump entered
the political arena in 2015 with a well-formed theory of
constitutional interpretation in mind. Obviously, he has decided
that originalists are the go-to folks in this area. If, hypothetically,
President Trump’s Attorney General and White House Counsel
both recommend a veto on constitutional grounds, it is not
See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153−54.
At the risk of repetition: They can certainly defend those subdelegations as
consistent with all manner of things besides the Constitution, and those other things
might well be more important to any given person than is the meaning of the
Constitution. I am not saying unconditionally that originalists must urge the president to
oppose subdelegations. I am only saying that they have good reason to do so if they regard
the meaning of the Constitution as normatively relevant, and that they must do so if they
regard the meaning of the Constitution as normatively decisive.
90
91
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absurd to imagine that President Trump would take that
recommendation very seriously.
Third, former White House strategist Steve Bannon declared
in February 2017 that the Trump Administration was committed
to “deconstruction of the administrative state.”92 The exact
meaning of the phrase is not important here. The significance for
present purposes is that the standard response to any attempt to
revive a constitutional principle against subdelegation is to
complain that it would be an assault on the administrative
state.93 That certainly seemed to be an important driver of the
decision in Mistretta,94 and I have heard something like it from
my colleagues for decades. If Mr. Bannon truly speaks for the
Administration on this point, it suggests that the standard
establishment response will not resonate all that well with the
current president. To be sure, there are nontrivial arguments to
be made that the unbundling afforded by subdelegation increases
democratic responsiveness in some respects,95 but these do not
seem like arguments that will carry much weight with a
constitutionalist who wants to deconstruct the administrative state.
Fourth, every force in the legal universe is currently aligned
to jump at the chance to constrain executive power. The political,
legal, and cultural establishments all despise the current
occupant of the White House. If there is ever going to be a time
for limits on executive power, this is it. And if those limits come
from the White House itself, would the establishment really find
it within themselves to resist?
Perhaps there never will be a time for such limits. Certainly,
those who think of President Trump as a swaggering,
overbearing, tin-plated dictator with delusions of godhood (or
perhaps even as a Denebian slime devil)96 will regard as
laughable the idea that he would turn down power. I am more
inclined than many to think that Donald Trump cannot be
written off as a power-mad autocrat, but maybe the many are

92 See Tim Hains, Stephen Bannon: Core of Trump’s Platform Is “Deconstruction of
the Administrative State,” REAL CLEAR POLITICS (July 17, 2017), https://www.realclear
politics.com/video/2017/02/23/stephen_bannon_pillar_of_trumps_platform_is_deconstructi
on_of_the_administrative_state.html [http://perma.cc/F7RS-MWES].
93 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323,
327–28 (1987). I use this citation only because I happen to have it on hand when writing
this footnote. I am sure that any reader will have favorite examples of their own.
94 See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
95 See generally David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000); Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
96 With apologies to David Gerrold.
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right. Maybe Adrian Vermeuele is right about the inevitability of
the administrative state; it certainly would not surprise me if he
was right about that. Perhaps, as with every other modern
president before him, Donald Trump will choose expanded
executive power over the Constitution, and perhaps the
establishment’s love for the administrative state is stronger than
its hatred for President Trump. But maybe, just maybe, an odd
combination of originalism, swamp draining, and the looming
specter of Trump-as-Congress will lead to something that no one
expects—maybe even something constitutionally more significant
than a comfy chair.

